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CURRENT DECISIONS
Contracts-IMposSIBILITY-IACCESSIBILITY OF USUAL AND CUSTOMARY ROUTE. In October, 1956, two months after the nationalization of

the Suez Canal by Egypt, a shipping company executed a voyage charter with the United States to carry a cargo of grain from Texas to Iran,
the contract stipulating the destination, but not the route to be followed.
In November, before the ship reached Suez, the canal was blockaded
and closed to traffic by the Egyptian Government. After proper notification, the ship changed its course and sailed around the Cape of Good
Hope, delivering the goods in Iran late in December. The shipping company collected the contract price, then, claiming that the closing of
the Canal had rendered performance impossible, brought an action to
recover the added cost attributable to the ship's forced deviation from
the normal sea route.' The United States District Court for the District
of Columbia dismissed the libel, and an appeal was taken to the United
2
States Court of Appeals.
The Appellate Court assumed that since no definite route was mentioned in the contract, the parties expected performance to be by the
"usual and customary" route, which they held to be the Suez Canal.
However, the court decided that the Canal's closing did not render the
contract commercially impracticable under Section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 3 since performance around the Cape was not
vitally different from performance through the Canal.
Initially, the common law held a promisor strictly to the terms of his
agreement. 4 This rule was applied until the middle of the nineteenth cen1. Plaintiff's theory of relief was quantum meruit for the added expense of $43,972.00,
above and beyond the contract price of $305,842.92, in extending a 10,000 mile voyage
by some 3,000 miles. The court not only held that this cost difference was insufficient
to constitute impracticability, but also said that quantum meruit was an improper
remedy, since the ship-owners had already collected their contract price and were now
seeldng relief for the additional expense of the trip around the Cape. Quantum meruit
could only have been a remedy for the entire performance.
2. Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
3. Under the UNIFoRm COMMCAIAL CODE, Section 2-615, a seller is excused from contractually agreed performance if three conditions are met: (1) a contingency must
occur; (2) performance as agreed must thereby be made impracticable; and (3) the
non-occurrence of the contingency must have been a basic assumption on which the
contract was formed.
4. Paradine v. Jane, Aleyn 26, 82 Eng.Rep. 897 (K.B. 1647) "(W)hen the party by
his own contract creates a duty of charge upon himself, he is bound to make it good,
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tury when, in Taylor v. Caldwell,5 the court of King's Bench held for
the first time that supervening destruction or non-existence of subject
matter considered essential to the contract would excuse the promisor
from liability. At present, there is a trend from the old view 6 requiring
strict performance toward a more liberal modern view, 7 which excuses
performance when it has become impracticable because of extreme or unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury, or loss involved, rather than only
when it is scientifically or actually impossible.'
Despite this trend, there were only three generally recognized classes
of cases in which nonperformance was excused prior to the advent of the
Uniform Commercial Code: 9
if he may, notwithstanding any accident by inevitable necessity, because he might have
provided against it by his contract."
5.3 B.&S. 826, 122 Eng.Rep. 309 (K.B. 1863).
6. Wilson v. Page, 45 Tenn.App. 475, 325 S.W.2d 294, 298 (195P): "Where a person
by his contract or agreement charges himself with an obligatioh possible to be performed, he must perform it, and he will not be excused therefrom because of unforeseen difficulties unusual or unexpected expenses, or because it is unprofitable or impracticable."
See also: Columbus Ry. Power & Light Co. v. City of Columbus, 249 U.S. 399 (1919);
United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132 (1918); Wills v. Schockly, 52 Del. 295, 157 A.2d
252 (1960); Phelps v. School Dist., 302 II. 193, 134 N.E. 312 (1922); Summers v.
Midland Co., 167 Minn 453, 209 N.W. 323 (1926); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Seattle, 9
Wash.2d 666, 116 F.2d 280 (1941); Bunch v. Potter, 123 W.Va. 528, 17 S.E.2d 438 (1941);
17 C.J.S. Contracts,Sec. 459 (1939).
7. 6 WiLusroN oN CoNrRAcTs, Sec. 1931 (rev.ed. 1938).
8. Wood v. Bartolino, 48 N.M. 175, 146 P.2d 883, 886 (1944). Accord, City of
Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, 45 Cal.2d 710, 290 P.2d 841 (1955); Mineral Park
Land Co. v. Howard, 172 Cal. 289, 156 Pac. 458 (1916); Strauss v. Kazemakas, 100 Conn.
581, 124 Ad. 234 (1924); Whelan v. Griffith Consumers Co., 170 A.2d 229 (D.C. Munic.
Ct. App. 1961); Fisher v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 313 Ill.App. 66, 39 N.E.2d
67 (1942); Powers v. Siat, 244 Minn. 515, 70 N.W.2d 344 (1955); Cosden Oil & Gas Co.
v. Moss, 131 Okla. 49, 267 Pac. 855 (1928).
9. 6 WILUSroN ON CowmAcTs, Sec. 1935 includes a fourth class of cases where impossibility is due to the failure of some means of performance, contemplated but not
contracted for. However, he classified these cases as standing on a more debatable
ground, although he felt that the law seemed to be tending in this direction.
This section of the text is cited in Merl F. Thomas Sons, Inc. v. State, Alas., 396
P.2d 76 (1964) (a case with facts strikingly similar to Transatlantic Financing Corp.
v. United States), where plaintiff bid to clear a highway right of way. However, ice
at the contemplated river crossing had melted, leaving the only possible ice crossing
seventy miles to the north. Since plaintiff could not move its heavy equipment across
the ice at the contemplated crossing, the court held that the contract was made impossible, and plaintiff was discharged, despite the fact that this condition did not appear
in the contract.
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(1.) When performance is made illegal by legislative act or 'byjudicial, executive, or administrative order.'0
(2.) Death or illness of the promisor, where his particular performance was bargained for."
(3.) Non-existence or injury of a specific thing or person necessary
12
for performance, or the material deterioration of such specific thing.
The Commercial Code adds to these three classes an additional test of
commercial impracticability, 13 which has heretofore only appeared by
court construction of the theory of implied conditions. 4 Having thus
codified the modern rule into statute, the Uniform Commercial Code
does not go on to define commercial impracticability, but leaves it to
the discretion of the courts. 1 However, the Code does say that increased cost alone does not excuse performance unless the rise in cost
is due to some unforeseen contingency which alters the essential nature
of the performance.

16

In TransatlanticFinancingCorp. v. United States'7 the District Court
decided that the closing of the Suez Canal was an unforeseen contingency
not reasonably within the contemplation of the parties; 18 nevertheless,
10. Scovil v. McMahon, 62 Conn. 378, 26 Atl. 479 (1892); Cordes v. Miller, 39 Mich.
581 (1878).
11. Browne v. Fairhall, 213 Mass. 290, 100 N.E. 556 (1913); Blakely v. Sousa, 197 Pa.
305, 47 At. 286 (1900).
12. Virginia Iron & Coke Co. v. Graham, 124 Va. 692, 98 S.E. 659 (1919); and cases
cited therein.
In addition, the RESTATEmENT provides for the situation where the non-existence of
particular facts makes performance impossible: REsrATE ET, CoNTRAcTs, Sec. 461, Comment (a): "There is no tenable reason for allowing a discharge for the non-existence
of a tangible specific thing that by the terms of a contract or the contemplation of the
parties is essential to its performance, and denying a discharge where other means of
performance similarly essential or contemplated cease to exist."
13. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, Section 2-615, Comment 3. (A much broader classification than Williston's "debatable" fourth category, supra note 9.)
14. See Ontario Deciduous Fruit Growers v. Cutting, 134 Cal. 21, 66 Pac. 28 (1901).
In this case, a contract for the sale of fruit was held to be subject to the implied
condition that the fruit was to be grown on the vendor's own land; consequently, he
was not required to supply fruit from another source at a greater expense when a
drought ruined his own crop. See also Browne v. United States, 30 Ct.Cl. 124 (1895).
15. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, Section 2-615, Comment 2.
16. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, Section 2-615, Comment 4.
17. Supra note 2.
18. The court decided that the nationalization by Egypt of the Canal Corporation
and formation of the Suez Users Group did not necessarily indicate that the Canal
would be blocked even if a confrontation resulted. However, the court did say that
these circumstances indicated a "willingness by Transatlantic to assume abnormal risks,
and this fact should legitimately cause us to judge the impracticability of performance
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the court did not feel that the detour around the Cape was so vitally
different from the contemplated route through the Canal 9 as to constitute "commercial impracticability," since the goods shipped were not
subject to harm from the longer route, the vessel and the crew were fit
to proceed around the Cape, and the difference between expected cost
and actual cost of performing was not sufficient. 20 By considering such
factors as plaintiff's personal ability to perform, the court construes
commercial impracticability to include something previously foreign to
the doctrine of impossibility, 2' thus presenting important guidelines for
future cases to be decided under this section of the Uniform Commercial
Code. Although the question remains as to what substituted voyage
would be sufficient to render performances impossible, the opinion of the
court implies that had the goods or ship been unable to withstand the trip
around the Cape, or had the amount of loss been greater, the contract
may have been nullified.
As one of the initial interpretations of commercial impracticability
under the Uniform Commercial Code, Transatlanticrepresents the current position of the Federal Courts on the doctrine of impossibility.
In all probability, with the advent of such a flexible new concept, further
expansion of the area of excuse will be forthcoming in the near future
as the trend toward liberality in discharging promisors continues.
Paul E. Holtzmuller
by an alternative route in stricter terms than we would were the contingency unforeseen."
19. One other U. S. case in which performance around the Cape was required whert
the Suez Canal was closed was Glidden Company v. Hellenic Lines, 275 F.2d 253 (2d Cir.
1960). This involved a charter for transportation of materials from India to America
"via Suez Canal or Cape of Good Hope, or Panama." Because of the express provision for an alternative route, the court held that the shipper was not discharged
from performance.
20. In so ruling, the court reached the same conclusion as the leading British cases requiring performance around the Cape when the Canal was closed, but based the decision on a different point of law. In Ocean Tramp Tankers Corp. v. V/O Sovfracht
(1964) 2 Q.B. 226, a ship was trapped in the Canal during the Crisis. The shipowners
were held to be estopped from pleading impossibility because they had breached the
contract by entering the Canal with anti-aircraft shells bursting overhead, thus endangering ship and cargo. By way of dictum, the court also decided that the shipowners would
not have been discharged had the ship stayed out of the Canal, since the ship and crew
were fit for a longer voyage; the particular cargo was not likely to deteriorate, and
the time of arrival was not material. See also Tsakiroglou & Co., Ltd. v. Noblee Thorl
G.m.b.H., (1960) 2 Q.B. 348 (Cape of Good Hope becomes the usual and customary
route when the Canal is rendered inaccessible).
21. "The mere personal inability of a promisor to perform is no excuse. This is

